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Ahead of the Curve: Promoting Land Tenure 
Secur ity in Sub-Saharan Afr ica to Protect the 
Environment 
Andrew R. Falk* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2006, the Sub-Saharan African economy has grown as fast as 
almost any economy in the world.1 At the same time, hundreds of millions 
of people still live in extreme poverty.2 One important reason for this 
disparity is that the economy is largely based on agriculture, which requires 
access to land. Far too many people lack such access.3 Thus, the absence of 
secure land tenure has contributed greatly to the institutionalization of 
                                                                                                                           
* Andrew R. Falk is a Senior Fellow with the Sagamore Institute in Indianapolis, Indiana, 
where he researches international environmental law and property issues. He also studies 
domestic criminal justice reform. In writing this article, Andrew gratefully acknowledges 
the invaluable research assistance of Benjamin Pickett and the instrumental drafting and 
editing assistance of David Dickmeyer, Logan Gentile, and Sheila Willard. 
1 Katie Simmons, Sub-Saharan Africa Makes Progress Against Poverty but Has Long 
Way to Go, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/09/24/sub-saharan-africa-makes-progress-against-poverty-but-has-long-way-
to-go/; Marco Pani, Resilient Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Despite Strong Headwinds, 
INT’L MONETARY FUND (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/car042815a.htm.  
2 See Simmons, supra note 1 (“Today, the percentage of people living on less than 
$1.25 a day in Sub-Saharan Africa (41 [percent]) is more than twice as high as any other 
region (such as Southern Asia, with 17 [percent]).”). 
3 See Daniel Ayalew Ali, Klaus Deininger & Markus Goldstein, Environmental and 
Gender Impacts of Land Tenure Regularization in Africa: Pilot Evidence from Rwanda, 
110 J. DEV. ECON. 262, 267 (2014), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3527/WPS5765.pdf?seque
nce=1 (describing Rwanda’s high population density, the dependence of 85 percent of its 
population on agriculture to survive, and the “environmental challenges” caused by 
farmers who had to “push into marginal lands, clear forests, and cultivate steep hillsides 
without proper soil and water conservation”).  
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poverty.4 For the millions of people without access to land, landlessness is 
synonymous with poverty.5 
Another incongruity is less obvious but nearly as important—for all of 
Africa’s natural resources and biological diversity,6 its environment is 
threatened by deforestation,7 desertification,8 soil degradation,9 erosion,10 
                                                                                                                           
4 See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Voluntary Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context 
of National Food Security, FAO, at v (2012), 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf [hereinafter FAO, Voluntary 
Guidelines] (“[p]eople can be condemned to a life of hunger and poverty if they lose their 
tenure rights to their homes, land, fisheries and forests”); Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Land Tenure and Rural Development, FAO, at 1 
(2002), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4307E/y4307E00.pdf [hereinafter FAO, Land 
Tenure] (“Land tenure problems are often an important contributor to food insecurity, to 
restricted livelihood opportunities, and therefore to poverty.”); see also Philomena 
Kebec, REDD+: Climate Justice or a New Face of Manifest Destiny? Lessons Drawn 
from the Indigenous Struggle to Resist Colonization of Ojibwe Forests in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 552, 556 (2015), 
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2886&context=wmlr (citing 
Olivier De Schutter, U.N. Special Reapporteur on the right to food, who argues that land 
cannot be treated the same as other commodities bin agricultural economies, landlessness 
causes poverty). 
5 See Kebec, supra note 4, at 556. 
6 See Joseph Opio-Odongo, Africa Environment Outlook 3: Summary for Policy 
Makers, UNEP, at 10 (2013), http://www.unep.org/pdf/aeo3.pdf (depicting Africa’s 
biodiversity hotspots, listing traditional medicinal cures, and noting that “fruits, 
vegetables, honey, spices, oils, bush meat, fish, edible worms [yum!] and mushrooms 
[can be found] found in Africa’s ecosystems [that] contribute to food and nutrition 
security on the continent,” and that in Zimbabwe alone 50 types of mushrooms, 25 kinds 
of fruit, and 50 vegetable species are harvested from the wild).  
7 See Theodore Panayotou, Environmental Degradation at Different Stages of Economic 
Development, in BEYOND RIO: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND SUSTAINABLE 
LIVELIHOODS IN THE THIRD WORLD 20 (Iftikhar Ahmed & Jacobus A. Doeleman eds., 
1995) (observing that forests are “particularly vulnerable” as developing countries begin 
to industrialize “when the rural sector is heavily taxed to generate a surplus for industrial 
growth and while a protected industry generates very few jobs for the induced ‘surplus’ 
rural labor.”).   
8 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, Addressing Desertification, 
Land Degradation and Drought in Africa, UNCCD, http://www.unccd.int/en/regional-
access/Africa/Pages/alltext.aspx (last visited July 10, 2016) (“For many African 
countries, fighting land degradation and desertification and mitigating the effects of 
drought are prerequisites for economic growth and social progress. Increasing sustainable 
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water shortages,11 and species extinction.12 Once again, land tenure 
insecurity plays an important role, and a heightened awareness and 
implementation of secure tenure would allow communities to take great 
strides in protecting Africa’s environment.13 
Alleviating poverty and protecting the natural environment are 
interconnected and critical elements for sustainable development in Sub-
Saharan Africa.14 This paper explores how secure land tenure addresses 
both elements, with a particular focus on the latter, exploring the ways that 
secure land tenure can sustainably protect the natural environment in Sub-
                                                                                                                           
land management and building resilience to drought in Africa can have profound positive 
impacts that reach from the local to the global level.”); see generally Kenta Ikazaki, 
Desertification and a New Countermeasure in the Sahel, West Africa, 61 SOIL SCI. AND 
PLANT NUTRITION 372, 372-383 (2015).  
9 Keijiro Otsuka & Frank Place, Land Tenure and Agricultural Intensification in Sub-
Saharan Africa, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AFRICA AND ECONOMICS: VOL. II, 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 289, 292 (Celestin Monga & Justin Yifu Lin eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter Otsuka & Place, Land Tenure] (recognizing that soil degradation will occur 
“until secure individualized land rights institutions are established to induce investment 
in land improvement.”); Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 23 (stating that 500,000 square 
kilometers of land have been degraded since 1950, and that 60 percent of the population 
in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Mali live on degraded land).  
10 Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 23 (citing studies indicating that African soil losses are 
between two and forty percent, the worst in the world). 
11 Id. at 19. Although Africa has many river basins and extensive supplies of 
groundwater, and although portions of the continent receive heavy rainfall, its water 
supplies are distributed unevenly across the continent and water scarcity is expected to 
increase from 47 percent in 2000 to 65 percent in 2025. Moreover, much of SSA lacks 
safe drinking water; indeed, almost one-third of the 884 million people worldwide who 
have no access to safe drinking water live in sub-Saharan Africa. Id. at 20.  
12 Id. at 10-11. 
13 Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment, and Economic Well-Being, in 
WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 51 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998) 
(finding that “environmental quality and economic growth rates are greater in regimes 
where property rights are well defined than in regimes where property rights are poorly 
defined.”).  
14 Emeka Polycarp Amechi, Poverty, Socio-Political Factors and Degradation of the 
Environment in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a Holistic Approach to the Protection 
of the Environment and Realisation of the Right to Environment, 5/2 LAW ENV’T & DEV. 
J. 107, 111 (2009).  
4 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Saharan Africa.15 To do so, Part I introduces the concepts of land tenure, 
tenure security, tenure reform, and the types of land tenure. Part II identifies 
two problems flowing from insecure tenure in SSA—poverty and 
environmental degradation. Part III discusses the benefits of tenure security 
generally, including how it helps alleviate poverty. Part IV narrows the 
focus and explores how tenure security helps protect the environment. 
Finally, Part V proposes specific policies that promote tenure security and, 
by extension, a reduction in poverty and protection of the Sub-Saharan 
environment. 
II. THE CONCEPTS OF LAND TENURE, TENURE SECURITY, AND 
TENURE REFORM 
Communities have long recognized some form of land tenure by using 
both written law and oral traditions.16 Land rights first emerged as society 
transitioned to “sedentary agriculture to encourage investment . . .  in the 
form of land clearing or establishment of perennials.”17 According to the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
Land tenure refers to rules and norms and institutions that govern 
how, when and where people access land or are excluded from 
such access. Land tenure security refers to enforceable claims on 
land, with the level of enforcement ranging from national laws to 
local village rules, which again are supported by national 
                                                                                                                           
15 FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 3 (recognizing that environmental sustainability is 
both affected by and has an impact on land tenure). 
16 Johannes M. Renger, Institutional, Communal, and Individual Ownership or 
Possession of Arable Land in Ancient Mesopotamia from the End of the Fourth to the 
End of the First Millennium B.C., 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 269, 269 (1995) (noting that 
“we are able to observe land tenure systems in varying degrees of accurateness from the 
end of the fourth millennium B.C. until Late Achaemenid times towards the end of the 
first millennium B.C.”; the written nature of these records is discussed throughout 
Renger’s article); Peter Ho & Max Spoor, Whose Land? The Political Economy of Land 
Titling in Transitional Economies, 23 LAND USE POL’Y 580, 581 (2006) (observing the 
“unwritten and fluid features” of the historic customary tenure rules). 
17 Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 264. 
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regulatory frameworks. It refers to people’s recognized ability to 
control and manage land–using it and disposing of its products as 
well as engaging in such transactions as the transferring or leasing 
of land.18 
Land tenure security is defined by many factors, such as how long a land 
right lasts, whether a right to land will be protected from those who threaten 
it, and how much control an owner has over her land.19 More simply, tenure 
“defines property and what a person or group can do with it—their property 
rights.”20 
Four types of land tenure are common: private tenure, where land is 
owned by an individual or corporation; customary or communal tenure, 
where land is owned in common by a group of individuals, such as a village 
or a tribe; state tenure, where land is government owned or the property 
rights are assigned to some government authority; and open access, where 
specific rights are not assigned to anyone, and no one can be excluded from 
using the land.21 
Of the four types of land tenure, customary tenure is the least well 
known. Through customary tenure systems, many Sub-Saharan 
communities22 have some form of land tenure, which is rarely recognized or 
                                                                                                                           
18 International Fund for Agricultural Development, Improving Access to Land & Tenure 
Security, at 27 (2008), 
http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/cpadocs/Land%20Access%20Rural%20Communities.pdf 
(internal citation omitted) [hereinafter IFAD, Improving Access]; see also World 
Resources Institute, World Resources 2005: The Wealth of the Poor—Managing 
Ecosystems to Fight Poverty, WORLD RESOURCES SERIES, at 57 (2005), 
http://pdf.wri.org/wrr05_lores.pdf [hereinafter World Resources] (noting that “secure 
tenure” is the “certainty that a person’s rights to continuous use of land or resources will 
be recognized and protected against challenges from individuals or the state”).  
19 See IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 27.  
20 World Resources, supra note 18, at 56. 
21 Id. at 59; FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 8. 
22  Approximately 90 percent of the land in Sub-Saharan Africa, other than national parks 
and private land, is administered under customary tenure. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Time to 
Legally Recognize Customary Land Rights, USAID (2013), 
http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/commentary/2013/08/in-sub-saharan-africa-time-to-
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protected by the government.23 Deeply rooted in indigenous culture, 
customary tenure usually provides security through extralegal or informal 
community frameworks.24 For example, lifetime land tenure security in 
Senegal, Chad, and Mauritania is guaranteed and informally regulated 
through rules of inheritance determined by Sharia law.25 More than 50 
percent of the peri-urban African population live in areas with informal 
systems of land tenure, with highly insecure land rights.26 These forms of 
customary land tenure do not usually involve any form of legal titling or 
registration, as most titled properties are in urban cities, which make up less 
than one percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s land area.27 At the same time, 
some communal tenure systems include strong household or individual 
rights to use a resource or plot of land, and some community tenure systems 
                                                                                                                           
legally-recognize-customary-land-rights); Rebecca Tapscott, Maximizing Achievements 
in Human Rights Development: Arguments for a Rights-Based Approach to Land Tenure 
Reform, XXVII PRAXIS FLETCHER J. OF HUM. SEC. 26, 30 (2012). 
23 Roy Prosterman & Tim Hanstad, Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century: New 
Challenges, New Responses, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 763, 765–66  (May 2006) 
(hereinafter Prosterman, Land Reform) (discussing plight of the poor who hold rights 
recognized by customary law but are not protected by the nation’s formal laws); Liz 
Alden Wily, ‘The Law is to Blame’: The Vulnerable Status of Common Law Property 
Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, 42 DEV. & CHANGE 733, 733 (2011) (“national land laws 
have generally . . . den[ied] that customary rights amount to real property rights, 
deserving of protection”); World Resources, supra note 18, at 60-61 (recognizing the 
continuing importance of community tenure systems at the local level versus national 
politics and institutions and the uneasy balance of power between them); see also Kebec, 
supra note 4, at 556 (discussing indigenous peoples’ customary title in Central and South 
America).  
24 Kebec, supra note 4, at 556; World Resources, supra note 18, at 59-60. 
25 Liz Alden Wily, Customary Land Tenure in the Modern World - Rights to Resources 




26  Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, THE WORLD BANK, at xxv (2003), 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/34919/landpoliciesexecsummary.pdf. 
27 Wily, supra note 23, at 2. 
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can be as secure as titled private property.28 Outsiders often confuse 
“communal tenure” with “open access” and opine that communal tenure 
property will be subject to the tragedy of the commons—the theory that 
natural resources held in common will be overused.29 This tragedy of the 
commons theory is particularly applicable to open access tenure, where no 
one is excluded from using the available resources.30 It is less applicable, 
however, to communal tenure where the community usually excludes 
outsiders and enforces limits to prevent overuse and increase the net product 
for its own benefit.31 
“Tenure reform” differs from “land reform” in that, whereas land reform 
often involves redistribution of land from the state or wealthy landowners to 
the poor, tenure reform adjusts the rights to possess and use land.32 Tenure 
reform often works to strengthen tenure rights by making such rights legally 
enforceable.33 
III. TWO FRUITS OF INSECURE TENURE: POVERTY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
Like a burgeoning tree without firm roots, economic growth without land 
tenure security precludes sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
creating particular consequences for both the social and the natural 
environment.34 An in-depth understanding of how insecure land tenure 
                                                                                                                           
28 World Resources, supra note 18, at 59; see also Kebec, supra note 4, at 556 (2015) 
(discussing the “complex system of allocating resources fairly among bands and family 
groups” amongst the Ojibwe in North America). 
29 World Resources, supra note 18, at 60. 
30 Id.  
31 Scott J. Shackelford, Neither Magic Bullet Nor Lost Cause: Land Titling and the 
Wealth of Nations, 21 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L.J. 272, 299 (2014); see also World Resources, 
supra note 18, at 60, identifying eight “principles for successful communal management 
of natural resources.” 
32 World Resources, supra note 18, at 57. 
33 Id. at 58.   
34 See IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 4 (listing pressures that “threaten the 
land and tenure security – and hence the food security and livelihoods – of millions of 
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devastates both the environment and those who depend on its bounty 
provides the requisite contextual framework in which to implement policies 
designed to inspire and promote land tenure security. 
A. Tenure Insecurity in an Agricultural Economy Institutionalizes Poverty 
It is not difficult to understand that “secure access to productive land is 
critical to the millions of poor people living in rural areas and depending on 
agriculture, livestock or forests for their livelihood.”35 Without reliable 
access to land and its produce, the poor are more susceptible to hunger and 
poverty; insecure access to land precludes their ability to invest in 
productive agricultural activities or to sustainably manage their resources, 
thus reducing their prospects for better livelihoods.36 More peripherally, but 
just as importantly, insecure land tenure makes the poor’s participation in 
democratic government and equitable relations with the rest of their society 
much more challenging.37 Specifically, insecure land tenure and the 
consequent lack of property rights prevent the collection of taxes by the 
government and undermine the reciprocal exchange of tax revenue and 
resultant social services.38 Consequently, many citizens are excluded from 
                                                                                                                           
poor rural people whose access to land was not previously under threat. This in turn 
raises the risks of environmental degradation and social conflict”). 
35 Id.; Elisabeth Wickeri, Land is Life, Land is Power: Landlessness, Exclusion, and 
Deprivation in Nepal, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 930, 998, 1014-16 (2011).  
36 FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 5-6; IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 
5-6, 13. 
37 IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 1. 
38Paula Ximena Meijia & Vincent Castel, Could Oil Shine like Diamonds? How 
Botswana Avoided the Resource Curse and Its Implications for a New Libya, AFR. DEV. 
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state revenue creation, which then terminates the social contract between 
the state and such citizens.39 
Instead of protecting property rights and securing land tenure for those in 
poverty, the governments of developing countries often exclude the poor—
either intentionally, due to corruption or prejudice, or unintentionally, due 
to bureaucracy, instability, or ineptitude.40 As resources in the world 
become more valuable, Africa has drawn considerable attention from 
investors who often seek (and gain) approval from governments to rent or 
purchase land.41 While much of Africa’s arable land is claimed by 
communities through customary land tenure, land rights are often either not 
recognized or ignored by the state.42 It is thus common for the state to seize 
this land and lease or sell it to an international corporation or foreign 
government, leaving the customary tenure holders who previously lived or 
                                                                                                                           
39 Id. 
40 See Tapscott, supra note 22, at 36 (Tapscott explains that the governments of 
developing countries are disinclined to help marginalized peoples who “typically have 
different political, religious, or social interests; they are marginalized for a reason.” 
Tapscott further warns that “in resource-poor economies, governments might be wary of 
giving any additional rights to citizens that could be politically or financially costly in the 
future.”). 
41 Rachel Knight, Statutory Recognition of Customary Land Rights in Africa: An 
Investigation into Best Practices for Lawmaking and Implementation, FAO, at ix (2010) 
(“scarcity is being exacerbated by wealthy nations and private investors who are 
increasingly seeking to acquire large tracts of land in Africa for agro-industrial 
enterprises and forestry and mineral exploitation.”). 
42 Id. (observing that “rural communities often have little power to contest such grants” 
because they “operate under customary law and have no formal legal title to their lands or 
documentation of their claims.”). Nevertheless, the governmental perspective is not 
always so nefarious: the challenge of what to do with land under customary tenure is a 
tricky one. As two scholars observed, “any national government that has embarked on the 
path of economic development is confronted with the question of what position informal 
institutions, such as customary and informal land use arrangements, should be accorded 
relative to the formal, statutory institutional framework. In land registration the question 
is whether to disregard or recognize land claims that predate the statutory legal system. 
Due to its unwritten and fluid features, customary tenure is generally seen as 
irreconcilable with a modernized economy that needs registered plots with clearly 
established ownership for efficient land market transactions.” Ho & Spoor, supra note 16, 
at 581.  
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relied upon the land for their survival with no remedy and few options.43 As 
a result, urban populations are booming but certainly not blooming—“the 
majority of urban dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa live under slum 
conditions, without durable housing or legal rights to their land or 
businesses.”44 
Meanwhile, the rural poor often have limited access to land for pasturing 
animals, growing food, and gathering medicinal plants45 and forest 
products. These “landed poor” remain poor because they have little land and 
because their right to the land is insecure.46 The property of the rural poor is 
largely undocumented, “making it highly vulnerable to land grabbing and 
expropriation with poor compensation.”47 For these poor, formalizing a 
legal right to property is frequently both unaffordable and overwhelmingly 
difficult, especially in countries with broken and corrupt governments.48 As 
a result, “extralegal” or informal systems remain prevalent in Sub-Saharan 
                                                                                                                           
43 Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food, 49 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 101, 103-05 (2013) (discussing a land deal between Ethiopia and Saudi 
Arabia. The Ethiopian government claimed no one lived on or used the land, but an 
investigation showed that villagers were forcibly removed from the land and that they 
only learned about the deal when bulldozers showed up to clear the area. The villagers 
were reportedly told, when they asked why they had to move off their ancestral land, that 
“you don’t have any land, only government has land.”).  
44 Stephanie Hanson, Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa, COUNS. ON FOREIGN REL. 
(Oct. 1, 2007) http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/urbanization-sub-saharan-
africa/p14327. 
45 Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 10 (finding that 80 percent of Africa’s rural population 
depends upon the continent’s biodiversity as a source for its traditional medicines). 
46 World Resources, supra note 18, at 56. 
47  How Africa Can Transform Land Tenure, Revolutionize Agriculture, and End 
Poverty, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2013/07/22/how-africa-can-transform-land-tenure-revolutionize-agriculture-end-
poverty. 
48 This article follows the custom of other authors in the literature and uses the terms 
“formalization” and “land titling” interchangeably. See, e.g., Shackelford, supra note 31, 
at 275 n.16.  
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Africa, causing Africans to miss economic opportunity, the benefits of 
formalization, or an appreciation of assets.49 
Thus, the absence of tenure security leaves many Sub-Saharan Africans 
without an opportunity to harness resources to sustainably alleviate poverty. 
This same tenure insecurity greatly impairs their ability to protect the 
natural environment.50 It is increasingly understood that “long-term, secure 
rights to land set the stage for environmental stewardship and sustainable 
farming practices.”51 
B. Tenure Insecurity Precludes Incentives and Opportunities for 
Environmental Protection 
It is well recognized that for all the riches of Africa’s natural resources52 
and its relative abundance of arable land,53 the continent’s natural 
environment is increasingly threatened by a number of dangers. These 
threats include poverty; rapid population growth; soil degradation, 
deforestation, and desertification; a global land “rush” for property; weak 
and corrupt governance; a land “productivity gap”; and insecure community 
land tenure.54 Three of these threats—population growth, the global land 
rush, and insecure community tenure—are discussed in this section due to 
their close connection with land tenure security.  
                                                                                                                           
49 Land Tenure, Property Rights, and Economic Growth in Rural Areas, USAID, at 2, 
http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/USAID_Land_Tenure_Economic_Gro
wth_Issue_Brief-061214.pdf. 
50 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 772. 
51 Id. 
52 Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 10. 
53 Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 262; see also Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, 
at 22 (recognizing that Africa’s supply of arable land has the capacity to produce 
sufficient food for the majority of the continent’s population). 
54 See, e.g., Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 262; Dustin Miller & Eyob 
Tekalign Tolina, Land to the Tiller Redux: Unlocking Ethiopia’s Land Potential, 13 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 347, 350 (2008); Knight, supra note 41, at v, ix; Akin L. Mabogunje, 
The Environmental Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa, 37 ENV’T 4, 5-8 (May 1995). 
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1. Sub-Saharan Afr ica’s Rapid Population Growth 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s population has skyrocketed from 228 million 
people in 1960 to over 1 billion people in 2015.55 At the end of the colonial 
period, social services expanded rapidly, particularly in the areas of 
education and health care.56 Due to these improvements, Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s infant mortality has dropped significantly, leading to a surge in 
population growth.57 While Sub-Saharan Africa's population growth could 
negatively impact the environment, most of the sub-continent still has a 
relatively low population density.58 Some of the best agricultural land is 
largely unsettled, while the areas that are less suitable for agriculture are 
more densely populated.59 Even in relatively densely populated areas, 
environmental damage most commonly occurs where three circumstances 
are met: (1) the population is greater than 500 people per square kilometer; 
(2) the area itself is physically or biologically vulnerable; and (3) the 
socioeconomic conditions impede the implementation of conservation 
measures.60 Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa’s rapid population growth becomes 
much more of an environmental concern in conjunction with other 
environmental threats, such as the degradation of soil fertility due to the 
intensification of agriculture without replenishment of nutrients.61 
                                                                                                                           
55 Sub-Saharan Africa Data, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/region/SSA 
(last visited October 6, 2016).  
56 Mabogunje, supra note 54, at 6. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 8. 
59 Id. at 31. 
60 Id. at 32. 
61 See Keijiro Otsuka & Frank Place, Evolutionary Changes in Land Tenure and 
Agricultural Intensification in Sub-Saharan Africa 1 (2013) [hereinafter Otsuka & Place, 
Evolutionary Changes], http://www.grips.ac.jp/r-center/wp-content/uploads/13-22.pdf. 
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2. The Global “Land Rush” and State Concessions 
Another significant threat to Sub-Saharan African environmental 
sustainability, which is directly related to land tenure security, is state 
appropriation of land—particularly land held by customary tenure—and the 
award of the land to foreign investors for purposes of mineral extraction and 
large-scale commercial farming.62 Over the last decade, attempts to 
purchase or lease agricultural lands in developing countries, such as those in 
Africa, have grown exponentially.63 One study documents the yearly growth 
of such agreements to have jumped from an average of about a four million 
hectares worth of growth in 2008 to more than 56 million hectares before 
the end of 2009, with the rates unlikely to slow.64 Another study indicated 
that about 60 million hectares of farmland were acquired in 2009—an area 
about the size of Arizona and New Mexico combined.65 In 2010, the going 
rate for such land acquisitions was approximately four dollars per acre per 
year.66 Such appropriations are often made without the consent or even 
knowledge of those most affected by the change—the residents who lived 
on the land.67 
                                                                                                                           
62 Kidane Mengisteab, Environmental Degradation in the Greater Horn of Africa: Some 
Impacts and Future Implications, THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE, 
http://www.twn.my/title2/resurgence/2011/251-252/cover02.htm (last visited April 25, 
2016); Ailey Kaiser Hughes, Threats to Land Tenure in Rural Liberia, WORLD RES. 
INST. 3 (Feb. 2013). 
63 Narula, supra note 43, at 105 (2013); Opio-Odongo, supra note 6, at 22 (estimating 
that Africa supplies 70 percent of the land leased or purchased by foreign entities to 
produce agricultural crops). 
64 KLAUS DEININGER & DEREK BYERLEE, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: 
CAN IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? xiv, 14 (The World Bank 
2011). 
65 Narula, supra note 43, at 106 & 106 n.35, 36. 
66 Id. at 105. 
67 Hughes, supra note 62, at 4; see also World Resources, supra note 18, at 57 (noting 
that “Government agencies, corporations, large landowners, poor farmers, indigenous 
peoples, and different ethnic or cultural groups frequently make overlapping and 
conflicting claims on the same set of natural resources. Unfortunately, unless the tenure 
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Such appropriations cause environmental damages both directly and 
indirectly. Appropriations cause direct environmental problems because 
large tracts of land are cleared, leading to deforestation and a decline in 
vegetative cover, with soil erosion, desiccation, and desertification 
following soon after.68 Less immediately, pollutants are emitted into the air, 
water, and soil.69 Appropriations indirectly cause environmental problems 
by taking land away from smallholder farmers who previously used the land 
to raise their livestock, grow their crops, and harvest natural resources such 
as coffee, cocoa, and rubber.70 These small farmers are thus required to 
more intensively farm their remaining land, leading to overuse and soil 
degradation.71 
3. Insecure Customary Land Tenure 
As serious as the global land rush is, even this threat to the environment 
of Sub-Saharan Africa is eclipsed by insecure customary land tenure. The 
amount of land under customary land tenure and the limitations of such 
systems, specifically its inability to withstand governmental actions to seize 
and sell the property, are readily apparent.72 Unfortunately, customary land 
tenure has further limitations. Whereas individuals with secure property 
rights may use their land as collateral, individuals with customary tenure 
                                                                                                                           
rights of the poor are secure, they usually lose out in these conflicts over competing 
claims”).  
68 Joachim von Braun & Ruth Meinzen-Dick (2009), “Land Grabbing” by Foreign 
Investors in Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities, IFPRI 3-4 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/ifpri_land_grabbing
_apr_09-2.pdf. 
69 Joseph Fargione, Jason Hill, David Tilman, Stephen Polasky & Peter 
Hawthorne, Land Clearing and Biofuel Carbon Debt,  319 SCI.1235, 1235–37, 
(2008), doi:10.1126/science.1152747. 
70 For guidelines on dealing with concessions (or “large-scale transactions”), see FAO, 
Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21-23. 
71 Mengisteab, supra note 62; Hughes, supra note 62, at 3-5. 
72 See supra notes 22, 23 & 67 and accompanying text.  
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have no economic assets, and thus no collateral upon which they can rely to 
obtain credit to invest in equipment and improvements.73 
Furthermore, while traditional communities have inherent strengths that 
lead to environmental protections, they also have certain weaknesses that 
cause environmental sustainability to break down.74 Uncultivated land in 
customary tenure systems, such as forests and pastures, is often in effect 
open access, even where the land may be informally managed by village 
leaders or by other traditional arrangements.75 Such open access has been 
found to be a major cause of deforestation and disappearance of communal 
grazing land.76 Even where individuals in customary communities could 
theoretically obtain deeds, it is often too complicated and requires too much 
time and expensive for the individuals to obtain the deeds.77 Thus, while 
customary tenure systems may have some value, in most current 
applications they are much more likely to fall short when it comes to either 
helping the poor or protecting the environment. With recognition of the 
negative precipitants of insecure tenure security and the shortcomings of 
customary tenure systems, this paper now turns to the benefits of secure 
land tenure. 
                                                                                                                           
73 Mabogunje, supra note 54, at 32. 
74 FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 24 (“Insecure land tenure is linked to poor land 
use which in turn leads to environmental degradation”). 
75 Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 2-3; FAO, Land Tenure, 
supra note 4, at 24. “The notion of unsustainable use of common property resources 
received considerable publicity through the ‘tragedy of the commons’ described by 
Hardin. This analysis of over-exploitation has been faulted because it was based on the 
unrestrained ability to use open-access property systems rather than the community-
controlled access of common property resources. However, at times common property 
tenure systems have been transformed into open access systems, for example, when a 
communal system becomes too weak to prevent the communal grazing lands from being 
used by people from outside the community.” Id. 
76 Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 2-3; FAO, Land Tenure, 
supra note 4, at 24. 
77 Hughes, supra note 62, at 3. 
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IV. TENURE SECURITY’S BENEFITS FOR THE POOR 
Secure land tenure has many identifiable benefits, from increasing land 
protection to decreasing the flight of the rural poor to constantly expanding 
city slums. This section describes eight general benefits of secure land 
tenure. 
First, land tenure security leads to an increase in agricultural 
production.78 Where a farmer knows his tenure is secure, he is much more 
willing to spend time and money to practice all the techniques required to 
raise a productive crop: buying good quality seeds, planting carefully, 
cultivating the crops, removing weeds and pests, fertilizing the soil, 
protecting the crops from pests, watering the fields as necessary, and taking 
all the other little steps necessary to achieve a maximum yield.79 A farmer 
with secure tenure will also think toward the future and be willing to invest 
in his land.80 For example, he could plant coffee, rubber, or fruit trees that 
will not yield a harvest for a number of years but will, when mature, 
produce a greater return than if the farmer had only thought about short-
term returns.81 These efforts will put the farmer in the best position to 
harvest a much larger crop than one who has made no such efforts.82 
Second, a farmer with secure land tenure is much more likely to improve 
and maintain his property, whereas one who may lose the fruit of his labors 
at any time has no such incentive.83 Since at least the time of William 
                                                                                                                           
78 World Resources, supra note 18, at 59. 
79 See Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 769. 
80 Frank Place & Keijiro Otsuka, Land Tenure Systems and Their Impacts on 
Agricultural Investments and Productivity in Uganda, 38 J. OF DEV. STUD. 107-09, 121, 
125 (2002). 
81 World Resources, supra note 18, at 59; FAO, Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 4, at 
20. 
82 See Shackelford, supra note 31, at 278 (observing that “the incentives created by 
private property rights are, assuming perfect enforcement, critical to enticing individuals 
to maximize the benefit of their land”). 
83 World Resources, supra note 18, at 57; Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New 
Approach to Environmental Protection, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 673 (2001) 
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Blackstone, the law has recognized that enforcing property rights 
incentivizes owners “to make socially desirable investments in improving 
assets.”84 Thus, property owners, including farmers, with secure land tenure 
consider what valuable improvements can and should be made to the land, 
“view[ing] maintenance expenditures and the like as investments in existing 
assets.”85 A farmer with established land rights on agricultural land is more 
likely to consider longer-term improvements such as manuring, rotating 
crop, conserving soil, and planting trees.86 In particular, a farmer secure in 
his tenure may add wells and irrigation pipes or trenches to transport water 
to the fields, drainage ditches or tile to remove excess rainfall, trees to serve 
as windbreaks, and swales and terraces to prevent erosion.87 
Third, land tenure security leads to the practice of sustainable 
agriculture.88 A farmer employing slash-and-burn techniques—where the 
                                                                                                                           
(observing that private owners “bear the costs of poor management decisions and have 
strong incentives to maintain their property”). 
84 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL. II: OF THE 
RIGHTS OF THINGS 979 (1766).  
85 Adler, supra note 83, at 673; Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 769. 
86 Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 3 (citing studies indicating 
that due to secure land tenure, tree cover increased on farms in Uganda and that farmers 
now grow trees on the edges of crop fields in East Africa); Tapscott, supra note 22, at 35. 
87 World Resources, supra note 18, at 57; see also Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra 
note 3, at 272, 274 (illustrating how farmers whose land rights were regularized under 
Rwanda’s land tenure reform were twice as likely “to have initiated or maintained soil 
conservation investments in structures such as bunds, terraces, and check dams” and that 
female heads of households with secure tenure were three times as likely to engage in soil 
conservation measures); Berhanu Gebremedhin & Scott M. Swinton, Investment in Soil 
Conservation in Northern Ethiopia: The Role of Land Tenure Security and Public 
Programs, 29 AG. ECON. 69, 82 (2003) (concluding that “tenure security encourages land 
improvements, notably the use of conservation practices”); Petr Sklenicka et. al, Owner 
or Tenant: Who Adopts Better Soil Conservation Practices?, 47 LAND USE POL’Y 253, 
257 (2015) (reporting the results of a study showing that erosion control measures were 
adopted in a significantly more responsible way by land owners than by tenants). 
88 See Sklenicka et. al, supra note 87, at 253, 257-59 (concluding that “land tenure 
security is widely considered to be a fundamental factor in motivating farmers to adopt 
sustainable land management practices”); Gebremedhin & Swinton, supra note 87, at 83 
(“Land titling and legal enforcement of title are fundamental for the widespread adoption 
and sustained use of conservation practices”). 
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farmer hacks a plot of earth from the forest, burns the area, and plants a 
crop for one season—must move on to the next season, as the soil is now 
nutrient-poor and he likely has no legitimate claim to the land.89 In contrast, 
a farmer with land tenure security has the opportunity and motivation to 
practice sustainable agriculture.90 A farmer who expects to own his property 
indefinitely is more likely not only to invest in his property,91 but also to use  
disease-resistant plants and to choose native, drought-tolerant crops.92 To 
allow for natural soil regeneration, a farmer who has secure land tenure is 
more likely to practice techniques such as crop rotation and leaving his 
fields fallow.93 
Fourth, due to each of the above factors—an increase in agricultural 
production, better property maintenance, and the practice of sustainable 
agriculture—a farmer with secure land tenure is certain to receive a much 
better return on his investment.94 These advantages are especially 
pronounced on smaller, family-operated farms, where “the highly motivated 
application of intensive family labor to a small piece of land owned or held 
securely by that family is precisely what makes economic sense.”95 These 
families also reap the nutritional benefit of retaining a significant portion of 
crops grown on the land, which would have otherwise been transferred to 
the landowner or landlord.96 
                                                                                                                           
89 See, e.g., Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 5-6 (noting that 
land may be put into fallow for twenty to thirty years to restore soil quality after only one 
or two seasons of cultivation). 
90 See Sklenicka et. al, supra note 87, at 254 (finding that of the four types of sustainable 
farming practices tested in their study, all were adopted in a significantly more 
responsible way by owners of property than they were by mere tenants). 
91 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
92 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 769; see also ROY L. PROSTERMAN & 
JEFFREY M. RIEDINGER, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 36 (1987). 
93 Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 3. 
94 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 770. 
95 Id. at 769-70. 
96 Id. at 770; Tapscott, supra note 22, at 35, 41, 42. But see Michael Roth & Dwight 
Haase, Land Tenure Security and Agricultural Performance in Southern 
 
Ahead of the Curve… 19 
VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 1 • 2016 
Fifth, secure land tenure increases the value of the property. Land will be 
worth more if it is more productive, has better returns on investments, and is 
better maintained.97 Land with secure tenure is also more valuable because, 
unlike unregistered land which is sometimes sold simultaneously to 
multiple buyers, the buyer of land with secure, registered title can be certain 
that he will receive that for which he has paid.98 
Sixth, owners of land with secure tenure can use that land as security 
(“capital”) to obtain credit.99 The use of such credit  allows the owner to 
purchase additional improvements for the land, better agricultural products, 
improved equipment for the operation, and other items needed by the 
farmer.100 Formalized tenure also serves as a safety net and a secure 
investment in times of financial crisis or in an uncertain economy.101 
                                                                                                                           
Africa, BASIS (1998), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacl422.pdf (last visited June 9, 
2016) (arguing that other research efforts have failed to factually prove that land tenure 
security results in better investment returns and discussing a detailed research effort 
focused on land tenure security and agricultural performance in Southern Africa, which 
concluded that “regardless of whether communal tenure systems are unproductive, 
upgrading tenure to individualized freehold does not ensure improved agricultural 
performance . . . the ‘real constraints’ on agricultural productivity are not land tenure but 
infrastructure, market efficiency, and production technology.”). 
97 Tapscott, supra note 22, at 36. 
98 See Karol Boudreaux & Daniel Sacks, Land Tenure Security and Agricultural 
Productivity 3 (2009), 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Land_Tenure_and_Agriculture.pdf (noting that “if 
formal transactions are allowed, sellers can command greater prices for their land”). 
99 World Resources, supra note 18, at 59, 62; Shackelford, supra note 31, at 301 
(observing that “the incentive structure of private property rights . . . give[s] the owner a 
pecuniary interest in refraining from destructive practices and that in turn may be used to 
catalyze the creation of capital markets”); Wickeri, supra note 35, at 998. 
100 Panayotou, supra note 7, at 33 (“Titling untitled agricultural land and allocating water 
rights to farmers and other rural dwellers would provide them with access to capital 
markets, thereby increasing on-farm investments that improve agricultural productivity 
and help to arrest the erosion of the resource base”); Prosterman, Land Reform, supra 
note 23, at 772-73. 
101 Tapscott, supra note 22, at 36. 
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Moreover, studies have shown that investment doubles on land with secure 
tenure.102 
Seventh, for each of the reasons above, land tenure security results in 
increased wealth, both for individuals and the national overall.103 It is 
recognized that “property in land has been a principle source of wealth and 
also a guarantor of individual liberty.”104 The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations acknowledges that “countries that have 
invested in the technical and institutional infrastructure required for 
efficient and equitable land tenure administration, and that have been in the 
forefront of ensuring property rights for both men and women, have 
developed much faster with a much higher level of food security, health and 
welfare.”105 
The same principles apply on a national level. One of the detrimental 
effects of insecure land tenure is soil degradation, which has a significant 
effect on the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP): 
The productivity loss due to soil degradation is pronounced in 
SSA. As much as 25 percent of land productivity has been lost due 
to degradation in the second half of the twentieth century in Africa. 
Because of the importance of agriculture to African economies, 
this has cost between 1 percent and 9 percent of GDP, depending 
on the country.106 
                                                                                                                           
102 World Resources, supra note 18, at 59. 
103 See Shackelford, supra note 31, at 285-86 (“The developed world got rich . . . because 
of advanced property systems that allowed entrepreneurs to realize the full potential of 
their fixed assets, and in turn led to the development of banking and capital markets.”); 
Steven J. Eagle, A Prospective Look at Property Rights and Environmental Regulation, 
20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 746 (2013) (“A strong system of private property rights 
promotes economic wellbeing, and also protects liberty and autonomy.”). 
104 Eagle, supra note 103, at 14. 
105 FAO, Land Tenure, supra note 4, at 5. 
106 Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, supra note 61, at 19 (internal citations 
omitted). 
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When land tenure is secure, landowners have a greater incentive to use 
sustainable agriculture practices, leading to greater production and therefore 
higher incomes.107 When agricultural families receive higher incomes, they 
have a greater ability to purchase goods and services in the marketplace, 
which also creates more demand for non-farm employment.108 In this way, a 
“broad-based distribution of land assets not only benefits the poor but 
becomes a solid basis for sustained and inclusive economic growth.”109 
Finally, tenure security leads to “grassroots empowerment” and 
democracy, reduced social unrest and instability, and reduced urban 
migration.110 Tenure security empowers landowners by removing 
hierarchies of control, allowing landowners to participate directly in the 
marketplace and political process.111 This shift represents a grassroots, 
marketplace-driven, and democratic redistribution of power, in which “more 
secure and self-confident producers . . . [can] challenge the inertia, elitism, 
and neglect that frequently characterize the politics of 
underdevelopment.”112 Tenure security also gives agricultural producers a 
stake in local communities—not to mention a sustainable income from the 
                                                                                                                           
107 See Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 769-70. 
108 Id. at 770; ROY PROSTERMAN, MARY TEMPLE & TIMOTHY HANSTAD, AGRARIAN 
REFORM AND GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT: TEN CASE STUDIES 312 (1990); KLAUS 
DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 17 (2003). 
109 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 770. 
110 Id. at 768; World Resources, supra note 18, at 62 (citing Hernando de Soto for the 
proposition that “the countries that achieve substantial economic progress over the next 
two decades will be those that have developed strong property rights institutions” and 
arguing that “tenure reform has emerged as an essential component of a broader 
sociopolitical transition to greater democracy and decentralization in developing 
countries”). 
111 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 770-71. 
112 Id. at 771; see also Land Policies for Growth and Property Reduction, WORLD BANK 
POL’Y RES. REPORT, at xvii (2008), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/2003/06/2457830/land-policies-growth-
poverty-reduction (arguing that widespread land ownership strengthens democratic 
accountability). 
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land—thereby reducing, if not eliminating, the pressure to migrate to urban 
areas.113 
V. HOW TENURE SECURITY HELPS PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
While the general benefits of land tenure security are relatively well 
known, there has been much less discussion of how tenure security protects 
the environment. Environmental protection stemming from land tenure 
security falls into two categories: a set of protections flowing from the 
aforementioned benefits, and a second more general set arising from the 
legal status held by a person with secure land tenure. 
A. Environmental Protection Flowing from Secure Tenure Benefits 
First, tenure security helps protect the environment when a farmer 
employs sustainable practices. As discussed in Part III, land tenure security 
leads to greater agricultural production.114 This growth in production means 
that each acre of land has become more efficient and that fewer additional 
acres must be converted from their natural state into pastures or fields. 
Second, better-maintained property, with greater improvements and use 
of sustainable agriculture, protects the environment directly—fewer 
chemicals and agricultural waste run off the land, the nutrient-depleting 
slash-and-burn techniques are abandoned,115 and wastes are reused.116 
Secure, transferable tenure provides incentive—even for someone 
unconcerned about or adverse to environmental protection—to consider 
environmental concerns, because “despoiling the resource [the property] 
may reduce its value in the eyes of potential buyers.”117 Tenure security 
stimulates land practices that protect the environment. 
                                                                                                                           
113 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 772. 
114 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
115 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 772. 
116 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
117 Adler, supra note 83, at 670. 
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Third, many of the benefits of secure land tenure, such as increased 
returns on investments, an increased value of property, an increased ability 
to use land as credit, and salability, both together and individually, 
contribute to a growth in wealth.118 It is well recognized that those with 
more disposable income can and do care more about better protecting the 
environment, and that support for environmental measures correlates with 
income.119 
Finally, and of particular interest to the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
secure land tenure is one of the keys to helping a developing country 
shorten the normal progression from a poor, uncontaminated state to a 
developed country taking environmental concerns seriously. Economists 
have articulated a theory identifying a relationship between income changes 
and changes in environmental quality called the “Environmental Kuznets 
Curve,” or “EKC.”120 According to this theory, as per capita income 
increases, pollution increases, peaks, then decreases, forming an inverted 
“U.”121 People with the lowest per capita incomes and who live on a 
subsistence basis pollute less because they consume products requiring less 
                                                                                                                           
118 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 772-73 (arguing that “by clarifying and 
strengthening existing informal and/or weak land rights, governments can create wealth 
for the poor and bring ‘dead capital’ to life”). 
119 JACK M. HOLLANDER, THE REAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: WHY POVERTY, NOT 
AFFLUENCE, IS THE ENVIRONMENT’S NUMBER ONE ENEMY 15-16 (2003) (arguing that 
“there is no inherent conflict between a healthy economy and environmental quality; 
actually they go hand in hand” and that “an environmentally sustainable future is within 
reach for the entire world provided that affluence and democracy replace poverty and 
tyranny as the dominant human condition”); Adler, supra note 83, at 681-84 (discussing a 
“significant body of literature [that] has found a correlation between economic 
improvements and several measures of environmental quality. . . . Wealthier societies 
have both the means and the desire to address a wider array of environmental concerns”); 
see supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text. 
120 Panayotou, supra note 7, at 13; Richard J. Culas, Deforestation and the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve: An Institutional Perspective, 61 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 429, 430 (2007). 
121 Panayotou, supra note 7, at 13; Culas, supra note 120, at 430; Usama Al-Mulali et. al, 
Investigating the Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis in Vietnam, 76 ENERGY 
POL’Y 123, 123-24 (2015). 
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energy and use few if any industrial processes.122 In contrast, people in 
developing economies initially pollute more because they use fossil fuels to 
light and heat their homes, fuel their transportation, and manufacture 
goods.123 In other words, at this stage “environmental damage [is] 
increas[ing] due to greater use of natural resources, more emission of 
pollutants, the operation of less efficient and relatively dirty technologies, 
the high priority given to increases in material output, and disregard for—or 
ignorance of—the environmental consequences of growth.”124 Once a 
higher level of income is reached, however, emissions level off due to a 
combination of innovations in technology and increases in energy derived 
from cleaner, renewable sources that make economies more successful.125 
For citizens of developing countries eager for not only rising incomes but 
also environmental protection, the “inevitability” of the standard EKC 
model seems to be depressing in that the standard model requires a period 
of environmental degradation in conjunction with “development and 
industrialization progress” and rising incomes.126 Additional study, 
however, has revealed that countries may “tunnel through” the EKC, 
                                                                                                                           
122 See Panayotou, supra note 7, at 25. 
123 Usama Al-Mulali et. al, Investigating the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
Hypothesis by Utilizing the Ecological Footprint as an Indicator of Environmental 
Degradation, 48 ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS 315, 320 (2014) [hereinafter Al-Mulali, 
Footprint]; Panayotou, supra note 7, at 25. 
124 Panayotou, supra note 7, at 17-18 (discussing low demand for environmental 
amenities when income is low, but observing that environmental degradation is also low 
due to low levels of waste and unimpaired capacities of the environment); see also Al-
Mulali, Footprint, supra note 123, at 319. 
125 Panayotou, supra note 7, at 18; Al-Mulali, Footprint, supra note 123, at 316. 
126 Panayotou, supra note 7, at 28 (observing a “certain inevitability of environmental 
degradation” as a country develops); Bruce Yandle et. al, The Environmental Kuznets 
Curve: A Primer, PERC RES. STUDY 02-1, at 4 (May 2002). But see Panayotou, supra 
note 7, at 28-30 (suggesting that “resources can best be focused on achieving rapid 
economic growth to move quickly through the environmentally unfavorable stage of 
development,” while also advancing multiple reasons, including possibly irreversible 
environmental damage as well as the impact of environmental degradation on the 
economy, why such an approach is unwise). 
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effectively taking a “shortcut” to higher income and environmental 
protection.127 To do so, a country may adopt appropriate policies and 
maintain quality institutions allowing it to “leapfrog ecological thresholds” 
and thus significantly reduce environmental degradation at low-income 
levels and speed up improvements at higher-income levels.128 Similarly, 
another study concluded that “improvement in institutions that empower 
people through secure property rights for forests will ultimately reduce the 
pressure on resources and lead to forestland conservation.”129 
Therefore, where a country provides well-defined property rights, 
eliminates harmful environmental subsidies, and establishes environmental 
standards appropriate for the country’s level of development, the country 
can flatten the EKC and achieve its environmental goals faster.130 This 
conclusion is buttressed by additional research indicating that there is a 
strong relationship between property rights enforcement and environmental 
quality.131 This research reveals that strong property-right institutions 
support free markets, which in turn leads to growth in income and wealth.132 
                                                                                                                           
127 Mohan Munasinghe, Is Environmental Degradation an Inevitable Consequence of 
Economic Growth: Tunneling Through the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 29 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 89, 107 (1999) (concluding that “developing countries could learn 
important lessons from the experiences of the industrialized nations, and devise 
development strategies that can ‘tunnel’ through any potential EKC—thereby avoiding 
going through the same stages of growth that involve relatively high (and even 
irreversible) levels of damage to the environment”); Hollander, supra note 119, at 15 
(observing that “developing societies have a tremendous advantage over yesterday’s 
[societies]” because they “do not need to tread through the entire learning experience in 
each technology area; instead they can ‘leapfrog’ over the pathways (and mistakes) of the 
industrial pioneers and jump straightaway to the environmentally kinder and smarter 
technologies of the twenty-first century”). 
128 Panayotou, supra note 7, at 14; see also Yandle et. al, supra note 126, at 13-14. 
129 Culas, supra note 120, at 436; see also R.T. Deacon, Deforestation and the Rule of 
Law in a Cross-Section of Countries, 70 LAND ECON. 414-30 (1994) (discussing 
deforestation in connection with land tenure security in the context of 120 countries); 
Panayotou, supra note 7, at 34, 36 (tying secure property rights to a flattened EK-curve). 
130 Panayotou, supra note 7, at 31-32; Yandle et al., supra note 126, at 14. 
131 Yandle et. al, supra note 126, at 14. 
132 Prosterman, Land Reform, supra note 23, at 770, 772-73. 
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As a result, two forces are at work in achieving environmental protection: 
the recognition and enforcement of land tenure security leads to higher 
income levels, which in turn generates demand for environmental quality.133 
B. Environmental Protection through Common Law Remedies 
Whereas the benefits of tenure security discussed above tend to deal with 
the possessors’ use of the land and resulting wealth, this final benefit of 
land tenure security arises due to the owner’s standing before the law. In 
other words, the benefit derives from the property-right aspects of the 
owner’s tenancy: owners with secure tenure can take legal action against 
those who pollute or damage their property.134 
Long before any specific environmental regulations existed, citizens used 
the common law to protect themselves and their property from damages that 
today we would consider environmental contamination.135 The common law 
served as a precursor to zoning laws, compelling polluters to locate 
themselves away from populated areas.136 More recently, the possibility that 
citizens could bring a common law action against polluters provided an 
incentive for pollution control technology.137 Today, individuals with secure 
property rights may pursue one of several common law actions—trespass, 
nuisance, strict liability, and negligence—to protect their property.138 
                                                                                                                           
133 Yandle et. al, supra note 126, at 14. 
134 What is Land Tenure, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U. S. (June 9, 2016) 
www.fao.org (see section 3.10 and Examples of Rights). 
135 Adler, supra note 83, at 670. 
136 Eagle, supra note 103, at 749. 
137 Id. at 749-50. 
138 See, e.g., Mercy O. Erhun, A Legal Framework of Sustainable Environmental 
Governance in Nigeria, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL RES. 3(4), at 30 (2015) (listing these four 
common law torts as protection for private individuals from environmental pollution). 
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1. Trespass 
Trespass actions “protect an occupier’s right to enjoy his or her land 
without unjustified interference.”139 Trespass is limited to direct or tangible 
interference, such as when a person causes a physical object to directly 
contact another person’s land,140 and one who commits such interference is 
liable for the resulting harm.141 Courts have developed the law of trespass as 
an intentional tort and typically construe its limits strictly.142 For example, if 
a defendant can prove that he trespassed accidentally, the plaintiff will not 
succeed, but the plaintiff may still succeed under a nuisance or negligence 
claim.143 
In environmental litigation, the law of trespass focuses on whether a 
tangible object—such as a power line or particles of air pollution—has 
entered another person’s property.144 If a plaintiff is successful, powerful 
remedies are available. A court may award nominal, compensatory, or even 
punitive damages, along with injunctive relief for threatened or continuing 
harms.145 For example, a plaintiff in Kenya pursued an action in trespass 
after the defendant began construction on the plaintiff’s property to install a 
utility line without following the prescribed land acquisition process.146 The 
High Court of Kenya granted a temporary injunction against the defendant 
                                                                                                                           
139 COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON MATTERS RELATED TO ENVIRONMENT 4 
(July 2001), http://apps.unep.org/redirect.php?file=/publications/pmtdocuments/-
Compendium%20of%20Judicial%20Decisions%20on%20Matters%20Related%20to%20
Environment%20National%20Decisions-20012292.pdf [hereinafter Compendium]. 
140 Id. 
141 Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 
38 ENVT’L L. REP. 10114-15 (2008). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 10116. 
144 Id. at 10115. 
145 Id. at 10116. 
146 Machareus Obaga Anunda v. Kenya Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd., Environmental 
and Land Civil Case No. 197, Kenya Law Reports [K.L.R.], ¶ 4, High Court of Kenya at 
Kisii [H.C.K. at Kisii] (2015), available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/113466/. 
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and ordered that fair compensation be provided to the property owner.147 
When applicable, the law of trespass can offer a strong remedy for property 
owners against those trespassing onto their property.   
2. Nuisance 
The second common law remedy has two variations: public and private 
nuisance, collectively considered “the true ancestors of environmental 
law.”148 Public nuisance actions arise when there is “an act or omission that 
causes inconvenience or damage to the public health or public order, or an 
act which constitutes an obstruction of public rights.”149 In general, a public 
nuisance occurs when the effect of the interference is so pervasive that it 
would be unreasonable for a single person to challenge the matter herself.150 
Public officers, such as attorneys general, are usually the only party with 
standing to challenge a public nuisance.151 
Private nuisance, while not always distinct from public nuisance, arises 
when there is a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private 
use and enjoyment of land.”152 Courts often evaluate private nuisance 
actions by considering factors such as whether the utility of the defendant’s 
conduct is outweighed by the gravity of the harm.153 
In the environmental context, a property owner may rely on private 
nuisance theory to challenge interferences like dust emissions from an 
adjoining cement plant, unpleasant odors from a nearby pig farm, or 
                                                                                                                           
147 Id. at ¶ 5. 
148 Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10116. 
149 Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern 
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 927 (1999). In other words, public 
nuisances concern “interference with the public’s reasonable comfort and convenience.” 
Compendium, supra note 139, at 4. 
150 Compendium, supra note 139, at 4. 
151 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 149, at 927. 
152 Id. at 928. 
153 Id. at 929. 
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groundwater contamination from a pulp mill.154 Similarly, an environmental 
public nuisance could include the contamination of groundwater, a release 
of hazardous chemicals into the environment, or common cesspools.155 As a 
result, parties may obtain a variety of remedies. A court may order equitable 
relief: operational limitations (such as emissions control devices), the 
establishment of funds for the benefit of injured persons, or even the 
imposition of a permanent injunction if the problem is not resolved within a 
specified timeframe.156 Parties may also recover money damages 
corresponding to depreciation in property value and certain special 
damages, including losses from injury to livestock or direct damage to 
property.157 
Several of these remedies were employed in Naigum v. Nanette, where 
the plaintiff’s health and property use were affected by an industrial 
byproduct that emanated from the defendant’s adjoining property.158 The 
defendant ran a licensed cabinetry business that employed the use of 
industrial electrical machines and caused noise and dust pollution in the 
residential area where the plaintiff lived.159 The Supreme Court of Mauritius 
ordered the defendant to pay compensatory damages to the plaintiff and 
placed a permanent injunction against the defendant to prohibit further 
hazardous industrial practices.160 
                                                                                                                           
154 Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10119. 
155 Id. at 10120-21. 
156 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 149, at 935. 
157 Id. at 934-35. In some circumstances, even punitive damages may be available. 
Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10120. 
158 Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment Related Cases, 
Revised 2nd Edition, at 28 (Jan. 2015) (citing Naigum R.L. v. Nanette G., 2004 SCJ 286 
(Mauritius)), 
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/publications/Compendium_summaries_judicial_de
cisions_revised_second_edition.pdf [hereinafter Compendium 2015]. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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3. Str ict Liability   
Under the theory of strict liability, a person is absolutely liable for the 
harmful results of any escapes from that person’s land.161 In other words, 
“[t]he theory of strict liability in tort for harms to strangers holds a party 
responsible for the harm that it causes by way of trespass or nuisance, 
regardless of the level of precaution taken.”162 The theory derives from the 
famous case of Rylands v. Fletcher,163 in which a property owner was held 
liable when his water reservoir flooded an adjoining property.164 In the 
United States, many courts have expanded the theory to cover other 
“abnormally dangerous activities.”165 In the environmental context, 
“abnormally dangerous activities” include, among others, crop dusting, 
operating oil refineries in densely populated residential areas, blasting, and 
fumigating buildings with toxic gas.166 In this way, strict liability remains a 
powerful theory in the environmental context, “as courts generally reason 
that, quite simply, entities engaged in dangerous activity should bear the 
costs of damages caused thereby.”167  
In Ndetei v. Orbit Chemical Industries Limited (Orbit), the High Court of 
Kenya relied upon Rylands when it ordered an injunction against Orbit’s 
industrial practice.168 Orbit manufactured soaps, detergents, and other 
related products, and it regularly drained industrial wastewater onto 
                                                                                                                           
161 Compendium, supra note 139, at 5. 
162 Richard Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection: How the Modern 
Environmental Movement Has Lost Its Way, at 8 (2015), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/research/richard-epstein-common-law-
environmental-protection-how-modern-environmental-moveme. 
163 Rylands v. Fletcher [1868], L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
164 Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10122. 
165 Id. 
166 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 149, at 937. 
167 Id. at 937-38. 
168 David M. Ndetei v. Orbit Chemical Indus. Ltd., Civil Suit No. 147, K.L.R., ¶ 9, 
H.C.K. at Kisii (2014), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/99244/. 
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Ndetei’s property.169 Ndetei complained that due to Orbit’s negligent 
construction and operation of the plant, Ndetei’s property had become unfit 
for occupation or agricultural use.170 For these reasons, the court 
additionally ordered Orbit to pay compensatory damages for soil 
restoration, general damages for nuisance, and court costs.171 
4. Negligence 
Unlike the three preceding causes of action, negligence actions do not 
depend on the occupation of property.172 As a general rule, a person is 
negligent when he breaches a duty of due care, resulting in injury to another 
person.173 In terms of remedies, a plaintiff may be entitled to compensatory 
damages and possibly (albeit rarely) punitive damages, but injunctive relief 
is not available.174 In the environmental context, negligence is often 
combined with the theories above and might be “the least productive of all 
tort law theories for environmental practitioners.”175 An example of 
environmental negligence where compensatory damages were awarded 
occurred in Agbara et al. v. Shell Petroleum et al., where the plaintiffs 
claimed that Shell’s negligence in constructing and failing to maintain a 
pipeline caused the uninhabitability of several square miles of land.176 The 
Federal High Court of Nigeria ordered Shell to pay the plaintiffs 
compensatory damages for the systematic damage caused by a pipe that, for 
15 years, had leaked crude oil onto the plaintiffs’ property and caused the 
                                                                                                                           
169 Id. at ¶ 30. 
170 Id. at ¶ 5. 
171 Id. at ¶ 1. 
172 Compendium, supra note 139, at 5. 
173 Id.  
174 Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 141, at 10121. 
175 Id. at 10122. 
176 Compendium 2015, supra note 158, at 52 (citing 
Agbara et al. v. Shell Petroleum et al. (Unreported) Suit No. FHC/ASB/CS/231/2001 of 
(June 14, 2010) (Nigeria)). 
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property to become uninhabitable.177 The Court also ordered Shell to 
remediate the contamination and restore the land to its original state.178 
5. Common Law Remedies Evaluated 
Since the birth of the major environmental acts in the United States—
such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species 
Act, and others—common law actions to address environmental 
contamination have been much less common in the United States.179 This 
may be beginning to change in the United States.180 Nevertheless, because 
most Sub-Saharan African countries do not have similarly comprehensive 
environmental legislation and accompanying regulations, the use of these 
common law actions may be more helpful and applicable in helping to 
protect the Sub-Saharan African environment. 
The application of these common law actions is not without its detractors. 
According to some critics, the actions are “cumbersome,” only “reactive in 
nature,” and merely “operate on the basis of reactive cure rather than 
prevention.”181 A second objection to applying the common law to 
environmental litigation is that it perceives “the common law as a rather 
primitive legal system.”182 Building on this shaky foundation, the critics’ 
                                                                                                                           
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 R. Trent Taylor, The Obsolescence of Environmental Common Law, ECOLOGY L. Q. 
40 (2013).  
180 See Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Common Law the Free Market Solution to Pollution?, 24 
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNI. SCH. OF L. PROP. AND ENV’T RES. CTR. (2012) 
(collecting articles from advocates calling for the use of common law approaches to 
protect property rights and concluding that while the “case for common law 
environmental protection has not been made . . . that does not mean it cannot be”); see 
also Meiners & Yandle, supra note 149, at 959-63; MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 110, 115-18 (1996) (defending a common law 
approach to environmental law, but recognizing that no significant changes are on the 
horizon). 
181 Erhun, supra note 138, at 31. 
182 GREVE, supra note 180, at 116. 
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argument next posits that only comprehensive legislation and administrative 
regulations “can account for the complexities of modern life.”183 
But, as a fair, analytical evaluation of the common law approach reveals, 
“nothing in the basic logic of common-law arrangements precludes their 
extension to more complex cases.”184 In reality, the very simplicity of the 
common law allows it to apply in many different situations—“[t]he basic 
intuition of the common law is that precisely because the world is complex, 
it needs simple rules that allow it to be managed not through collective, 
centralized, one-size-fits-all arrangements but in small chunks and by 
individuals who are likely to get the results.”185 Thus, Sub-Saharan Africans 
may find these common law actions to be very helpful in addressing their 
unique environmental law situations.186 
                                                                                                                           
183 Id.; see also Joseph Sax, Introduction, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, at xvii (Clifford Rechtstaffen & Denise Antolini, eds.) 
(2007) (opining that “the traditional common law remedies were utterly inadequate to 
deal with contemporary environmental problems”). One could respond that it is 
impossible for even the exceptionally complex U.S. environmental regulations to handle 
every possible environmental situation. “It is uncontested, for example, that much 
regulation is woefully inefficient and needlessly expensive; only the order of magnitude 
is seriously disputed.” GREVE, supra note 180, at 87. Greve similarly argues that this 
perspective on regulations “is emphatically not a partisan phenomenon but approaches a 
consensus: virtually no economist or policy analyst of any political persuasion would 
defend the existing regulatory regime—taken as a whole—as even tolerably efficient and 
effective.” Id.; see also id. at 88 (discussing further regulatory woes and experts critical 
of environmental regulation). 
184 Greve, supra note 180, at 116. 
185 Id. at 116-17. 
186 This author is not suggesting that these common law actions should be used to address 
environmental issues to the exclusion of national regulation. Nevertheless, he is 
proposing that they may be useful alongside governmental regulation to protect the 
property of individuals, particularly where it is widely recognized that many Sub-Saharan 
governments are less than vigilant in their monitoring of environmental contamination, to 
say nothing of their actual enforcement of their environmental regulations. 
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VI. POLICIES THAT ARE WORKING TO PROMOTE TENURE SECURITY 
Recognizing that land tenure security is instrumental not only in helping 
the poor but also in protecting the environment, this part discusses policies 
to promote tenure security in two types of situations: (A) where tenure 
security needs to be strengthened, such as in many customary tenure 
situations or where the individuals are using land belonging to another, 
albeit without opposition; or (B) where there is almost no tenure security, 
because either the land possessors’ claims are completely absent or the land 
possessors have no access to the land at all. 
A. Strengthening Land Tenure Security 
Tenure reformers take two primary approaches to helping promote tenure 
security: (1) formalizing property rights by issuing titles to land, or (2) 
promoting strengthened security by helping governments recognize 
traditional customary tenure. 
1. Formalization of Land Tenure 
There is little argument that registered land tenure is the most secure 
form of tenure security.187 In considering the development of nations, “there 
is a growing consensus ‘that the material rise of the West during the last’ 
three centuries is at least in part attributable to legal institutions formalizing 
property rights.”188 In the years since South American economist Hernando 
de Soto published his book, The Mystery of Capital,189 world leaders have 
praised his theory that the formalization of property rights is the key to a 
                                                                                                                           
187 Lasse Krantz, Securing Customary Land Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from 
New Approaches to Land Tenure Reform, GOTEBORGS UNIVERSITET DEPT. OF ECON. & 
SOC’Y 1 (2015) (noting that the “conventional approach for securing property rights to 
land is by establishing a system of private ownership through individual titling”). 
188 Shackelford, supra note 31, at 285 (quoting O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41 
AM. BUS. L. J. 459, 470 n.34 (2004). 
189 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN 
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). 
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country developing and flourishing,190 and many nations and agencies have 
sought to implement his recommendations.191 Few argue with de Soto’s 
basic premises that secure property rights are invaluable to progress and 
development and that providing individuals with title to property is, 
wherever possible, the ideal.192 
Unfortunately, formalizing land tenure—giving title to the owner of a 
property that has not previously been titled—can be difficult.193 For 
example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, land titles have rarely been issued, if at 
all.194 Title administrators must be trained, property borders must be 
established, and titles must be formatted, created, and distributed. Even 
where land titles are available, the process to obtain title is often arduous 
and expensive.195 As de Soto exhaustively documented, the cost to purchase 
land (not including the land price) can be expensive, and obtaining legal 
                                                                                                                           
190 In 2004, President Bill Clinton characterized de Soto as “probably the world’s most 
important living economist” because of his work on property rights. This Land Is Your 
Land, WORLD POL’Y INST., http://www.world policy.org/journal/summer2011/this-land-
is-your-land (last visited April 21, 2016). Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. 
Bush officially backed de Soto’s views. Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 184 n.2 (1995). 
191 See Hendrix, supra note 190, at 184 n.2 & 185-86 (collecting examples). 
192 See id. Hendrix, after identifying six “myths” in response to de Soto’s work, admits 
that “titling of property may give security” and that “security of ownership plays [an 
important role] in economic development.” Id. at 209, 212. Hendrix’s main point is that 
while “titling is a highly important ingredient to a more general strategy for development 
. . . the true impact of titling should not be overstated, nor should other factors be ignored. 
Such an overemphasis would give policymakers unrealistic expectations about the way in 
which titling does impact on broadly based economic growth.” Id. at 183. 
193 Indeed, some have suggested that the problems with existing land tenure in Sub-
Saharan Africa are so complex that no effort to overcome the challenges will be 
successful. Thankfully, this opinion has not stopped many individuals and institutions 
from pursuing reform. 
194 Liz Alden Wily, How African Governments Allow Farmers to be Pushed off Their 
Land, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2012) http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/poverty-matters/2012/mar/02/african-governments-land-deals. 
195 See, e.g., Wickeri, supra note 35, at 973-74, 986 (reciting the challenges Nepali 
farmers undergo to obtain land certificates, the Nepali equivalent to land titles). 
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title to the land (where a title is available at all) and a building permit can be 
very time-consuming.196 
With a view toward promoting tenure security and reducing or 
eliminating these costs and barriers, reformers such as de Soto, as well as 
governments of developing countries, have sought to implement 
formalization procedures in many developing countries.197 For example, 
Rwanda has engaged in a series of land reforms seeking to protect property 
rights for its citizens.198 Legislation was enacted providing that both sons 
and daughters could inherit parental property, property rights of women in a 
legal marriage were protected, and spousal consent was required before 
matrimonial property was transferred.199 Subsequently, additional reforms 
established a “single statutory system of land tenure that vests land 
ownership with the state and provides users with long-term usufruct rights 
(up to 99 years, depending on land use) that can be sold, passed on to heirs, 
mortgaged, leased, or otherwise transferred.”200 Trained surveyors travelled 
throughout the country identifying parcel boundaries, recording them on 
aerial photos, and issuing receipts.201 The information was transferred to a 
registry, digitized, and publically displayed.202 Although more studies need 
to be done, initial studies indicate that Rwanda’s tenure reforms have 
                                                                                                                           
196 Key Concepts, THE POWER OF THE POOR, 
http://www.thepowerofthepoor.com/concepts/c7.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (citing 
de Soto’s researching showing the following times and costs: in Guatemala, 4,307 days 
and $9,312 (4.3 years pay); in Argentina, 3,974 days and $12,592 (4.3 years pay); in 
Albania, 225 days and $816 (three months pay); in Egypt, 1,371 days, $5,070 (more than 
three years pay); in Tanzania, eight years and $2,252 (more than three years pay)); see 
also DE SOTO, supra note 189, at 18-28. 
197 See M. Mercedes Stickler & Heather Huntington, Perceptions of Tenure Security: An 
Exploratory Analysis of Pretreatment Data in Rural Communities Across Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Liberia, and Zambia, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 23, 2015). 
198 Ali, Deininger & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 267-74. 
199 Id. at 267. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 268. 
202 Id. 
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provided secure tenure, helped protect the environment, and increased 
protection for married women and girls.203 
Nevertheless, other efforts have been less rewarding, and researchers 
have found that efforts to obtain title, certification, or registration had mixed 
results in strengthening individual land rights.204 Indeed, some scholars 
have found that efforts to achieve formal tenure systems may increase 
tenure insecurity in some places due to the conflicts between traditional 
rights and the newly created legal land rights.205 Similarly, others have 
recognized that attempts to bring about “exclusive, alienable and legally 
registered individual land rights [are] not always the best solution for poor 
rural people.”206 Many poor farmers have come to “depend on more 
flexible, diversified, decentralized and common property systems over 
which they can often exert greater influence and that are more conducive to 
optimum uses of land.”207 In the face of these odds, many reformers have 
switched their focus from formalization of property rights to strengthening 
customary tenure systems.208 
                                                                                                                           
203 Id. at 267, 274. 
204 See Krantz, supra note 187, at 1-2; see also Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, 
supra note 61, at 9. 
205 Otsuka & Place, Land Tenure, supra note 9 at 263 (explaining that tenure insecurity 
results because of conflicts between traditional rights and the newly formalized rights and 
opining that “[o]nce the individualization of land rights has been achieved endogenously, 
land registration is likely to strengthen land rights because of the absence of overlapping 
land rights among family members.”); see also Otsuka & Place, Evolutionary Changes, 
supra note 61, at 10. 
206 IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 6. 
207 Id. 
208 To be sure, there are still those who favor the effort to formalize property rights. 
Hernando de Soto continues to urge that formalization is necessary and that without overt 
efforts, “it could take 300, 500 years” for formalization to occur and for greater 
prosperity to be achieved. Tapscott, supra note 22, at 33, quoting de Soto, “Commanding 
Heights,” Video Transcript, PBS (March 30, 2001), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_ 
hernandodesoto.html. 
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2. Customary Tenure as a Means of Tenure Reform 
Due to the challenges of efforts to replace customary tenure systems with 
title formalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, tenure reformers have shifted 
their approach from replacement to adaptation.209 In other words, reformers 
have concluded that instead of implementing Western-style individual land 
rights to the exclusion of customary tenure, it may be easier and more 
effective to work within the customary tenure system to strengthen the 
property rights of the community. North American readers may appreciate 
the example of the challenges the United States Congress encountered when 
it attempted to convert Native American communal tenure to individually 
titled property, a process called “allotment.”210 According to one reviewer, 
the allotment failed because Congress sought to “impose private property 
on the indigenous peoples who had no conception of the private ownership 
of land.”211 A more insightful perspective, however, suggests that because 
the Native Americans actually already possessed a “complex system of 
fluid tribal property rights,” the allotment failed because it “impos[ed] a 
rigid system that failed to account for traditional Native American property 
rights regimes that were based on cultural norms reflective of the common 
social good.”212 Thus, tenure reformers cannot simply expect to establish a 
“single, externally-imposed and static system of private property rights” 
that will be a “one-size-fits-all solution to catalyzing capital and building 
wealth.”213 The goal must be to work with local communities in customary 
tenures to reinforce rather than replace customary tenure systems.214 
                                                                                                                           
209 World Resources, supra note 18, at 61. 
210 Shackelford, supra note 31, at 277. 
211 Id. (quoting Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the 
Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1561 (2001)). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 278. 
214 Id. at 279. 
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 One of the more innovative approaches to helping establish a more secure 
customary system has been proposed by land tenure expert Liz Alden Wily, 
who suggests that “it is above all rural people’s rights to the collectively 
possessed and used ‘commons’ that need protection in Africa.”215 Alden 
Wily includes the commons area in her proposal for two reasons.216 First, 
these resources—off-farm woodlands and pastures—are especially 
vulnerable to being used and abused by outsiders.217 Second, these 
commons are considered by many African governments to be publican 
lands.218 Alden Wily’s approach therefore works to secure the entire area—
both individually held property and off-farm commons—as community-
owned property.219 
B. Creating Land Tenure Security 
For many of the Sub-Saharan African poor, their poverty stems from 
effective or complete landlessness. They may be slum-dwellers with no 
more land than that upon which the crate they call home sits, or they may be 
trying to scratch some meager existence from the dirt alongside a rural road. 
In any case, the discussion of providing land tenure security is meaningless 
to them because they have no access to land. 
In such circumstances, particularly where “a high degree of ownership 
concentration is combined with a significant level of rural poverty 
attributable to lack of access to land, fisheries and forests,” land 
redistribution may be an effective means of providing the poor with land 
and secure land tenure.220 Allocation of public land,221 voluntary and 
                                                                                                                           
215 Krantz, supra note 187, at 11-12. 
216 Id. at 12. 
217 Id.  
218 Id. 
219 Id. For additional customary tenure reform proposals and studies of existing reforms, 
see Knight, supra note 35. 
220 FAO, Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 4, at 25-26. 
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market-based purchases of land, or seizure by eminent domain and 
redistribution of land to the poor “can facilitate broad and equitable access 
to land and inclusive rural development.”222 
Certain practices are necessary, however, to help ensure that land 
redistribution leads to secure land tenure and not bitterness and resentment, 
which can lead to open hostility, strife, and revenge.223 Thus, whether the 
land is seized by eminent domain or procured on the market, efforts must be 
made to ensure that adequate compensation is provided without undue delay 
for the expropriated or purchased land.224 Many tenure reform efforts have 
failed largely because the financing for expropriation has been insufficient 
to adequately compensate the former owners of the land and legitimize the 
reforms.225 Insufficient compensation almost guarantees that the landowners 
who are losing property whose property is being taken will “evade the law, 
cause the law to be rescinded, or violently resist enforcement” of it.226 
Payments may be less than market value, but should replace the former 
owners’ lost income from the land.227 Furthermore, where the transfer is by 
                                                                                                                           
221 The distribution of public lands is not uniformly supported. Professors Prosterman and 
Hanstad argue that alternatives such as distribution of public lands, voluntary sales of 
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eminent domain, the state must be careful not to communicate a sense of 
judgment or penalty on the former owners.228 
Care must be taken to ensure that the redistribution is successful. While 
the amount of the land provided to the beneficiary should be sufficient to 
earn an adequate standard of living,229 the size of the property supplied need 
not be excessively large, as even small land plots with tenure security can 
provide significant benefits.230 Providing plots of land sufficient for a small 
house and garden, between 1/25 acre (about 1,730 square feet) and 1/10 
acre (about 4,350 square feet), to agricultural families has proved to make a 
significant difference for the beneficiaries.231 While these plot sizes may 
seem very small to many Westerners, it is important to realize both how 
productive a small plot can be232 and how valuable to a poor family the plot 
will be.233 The state should use the amount of land a family can farm with 
its own labor and capital as a guideline for sizing the property.234 
In addition to right-sizing the property redistributed, the state should also 
ensure that the beneficiary has access to credit, markets, farming advice, 
technical assistance, and other resources necessary to make the 
redistribution successful.235 Some tenure reforms have failed in large part 
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because, despite the provision of land and tenure security to the 
beneficiaries, the new owners had “no other inputs and services to be able 
to cultivate [the land] properly.”236 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A growing body of scholarly research ably demonstrates that land tenure 
security provides relief for the poor. Those with no- or low-income, upon 
obtaining secure access to land, enjoy improved livelihoods because they 
can grow more food, harvest more products for consumption or trade, invest 
in more economically productive activities, and use the property to obtain 
credit. 
The research is less developed but equally persuasive that land tenure 
security also promotes environmental protection. Where a country adopts 
law and policies promoting and protecting tenure security, it can 
significantly reduce environmental degradation. Land tenure security also 
results in greater environmental protection through better stewardship of 
natural resources. Thus, farmers who have secure land tenure are motivated 
not only to make improvements to aid in their agricultural work but also to 
help improve their environment. Providing secure land tenure under the rule 
of law and enforcing claims under the common law, enables developing 
countries to achieve their environmental goals faster. 
To achieve these ends, progress must continue to be made in formalizing 
property rights, strengthening customary tenure systems, redistributing land, 
and providing tenure security to the landless poor. 
                                                                                                                           
236 IFAD, Improving Access, supra note 18, at 6, 13 (noting that “measures to strengthen 
land tenure security must be complemented by pro-poor policies, services and 
investments that reduce vulnerability and enable people to make the best use of their 
access to land”). 
